Mexico’s judiciary now serves many masters
by Jacques Coste.
Many analysts have argued that Mexico’s recent judicial elections removed the last check on presidential power because several candidates with clear connections or affinities with Morena won, and hence the Supreme Court justices will be aligned with the ruling party. But this is only part of the story. The scenario is even worse. Mexico’s judiciary will respond partially to the interests of the executive branch, but it will also respond to the objectives of different regional elites, such as local political leaders, businesspersons, law firms, and organized-crime groups.
The reason why so many analysts believe that Mexico’s judiciary will exclusively respond to the president’s wishes is that they are taking the PRI regime as a model. However, there are two problems with this assumption.
First, during the PRI regime, the Supreme Court - and the judicial system as a whole - wasn’t as subsumed into the power orbit of the executive branch as is generally thought. As historian Pablo Mijangos argues, while it is true that the post-revolutionary Supreme Court lent constitutional legitimacy to the actions of the sitting president, it is also true that the justices enjoyed broad autonomy when deciding the majority of cases, which did not clearly concern the executive branch.
In other words, during the PRI regime, the judiciary supported the hegemonic party in controversies directly linked to the interests of the sitting president. But the way judges resolved cases between common citizens depended on a combination of factors, such as the ideology and capabilities of the judges, money and power differentials between the parties involved, and relationships (or lack thereof) between the citizens and PRI members or government officials who could help them pressure the judges. This will be the case once again in Mexico - but with an additional layer of complexity. And this is where the second problem with the assumption that the president will control the entire judiciary comes in.
On Mexico’s imminent risk
by Macario Schettino.
Last Sunday, elections were held in Mexico—very unusual elections that are virtually unheard of in any other country in the world. Judges, magistrates, and justices were elected in order to completely replace the Supreme Court, to create a new Judicial Discipline Tribunal, and to fill the federal and local electoral courts, which had been incomplete. Not only that—more than eight hundred circuit magistrates and judges were elected, for a total of 881 positions.
With this election, and the law that made it possible, the Judicial Branch in Mexico ceases to be autonomous and becomes subordinated to the Executive Branch, which also controls the Legislative Branch thanks to the qualified majorities it obtained illegally just days after last year’s presidential election. Put more simply, Mexico ceases to be a republic and becomes an authoritarian system. The new judges will take office in September.
This new distribution of power—or rather, concentration of power—is a major change from just a few years ago, when the USMCA was signed, and it actually contradicts that agreement. It adds to changes in energy policy, which are also incompatible, and I don't think it will make negotiations for a new deal with the United States and Canada any easier. Even more concerning, the risk for existing investments in Mexico has increased, as the mechanisms previously available for dispute resolution have disappeared.
Amid international fallout, a local tragedy
by Madeleine Wattenbarger.
Until last week, Ximena Guzmán Cuevas and José Muñoz were not public figures. Longstanding members of the ruling Morena Party, they both held senior positions in Mexico City’s government. Guzmán worked as Mayor Clara Brugada’s personal secretary; Muñoz as an adviser, coordinating closely with the national government, including on security issues. On Tuesday, May 20, a little after 7 a.m., Guzmán pulled over on a busy stretch of Tlalpan Avenue to pick up her coworker. A gunman fired twelve shots into the car, killing both Ximena and Pepe.
The assassination was timed for maximum visibility: up the road, in the National Palace and in view of the press, Security Secretary Omar García Harfuch informed President Sheinbaum of the events. She announced the news live to the nation.
A week later, information is scarce and the suspects remain at large. At a press conference the day after the murders, Mexico City’s top prosecutor, Bertha Alcalde Luján, and Public Security Secretary Pablo Vázquez Camacho refrained from answering questions about possible motives. The location, timing, and calculated execution suggest a professional hit: the assassins worked in a trio, used gloves to avoid leaving fingerprints, and escaped in a stolen car into the eastern fringes of Mexico State.
Many Mexicans won’t vote in Sunday’s judicial elections; will AMLO?
by David Agren.
Mexico holds judicial elections on Sunday, which will select nearly 900 judges – including supreme court justices – via popular vote. But the much anticipated elections are unfolding amid confusion, controversial candidates, and crushing disinterest – with voters paying scant attention and the ruling MORENA party marshalling voters in what was supposed to be a non-partisan vote. Then there’s the opposition boycott.
President Claudia Sheinbaum targeted the opposition throughout the week leading up to the June 1 vote. She jawboned them from the bully pulpit of her morning press conference. And she employed the familiar schoolyard taunt effectively used by her predecessor and populists the world over: I know you are but what am I?
“Who is more anti-democratic: the ones calling for everyone to elect the judiciary or the ones calling for not voting? Who is more democratic?” Sheinbaum said in the Wednesday mañanera. “The argument is very convoluted, isn’t it? If the president had wanted to pick the Supreme Court’s justices, we wouldn’t have ended up as we were before. Why all the fuss?”
Three points on Mexico’s judicial vote
by Luis Rubio.
Judicial reform reaches its critical moment this coming Sunday. After the constitutional reform was approved last September, this Sunday citizens will vote for judges, magistrates, and justices of the Supreme Court of Justice. There is no precedent in the world (with the small exception of Bolivia) where a country has undertaken an exercise of this nature. The requirements for someone to aspire to one of these positions were minimal and unrelated to the function they are to perform. In fact, the most important requirement was having been approved by a panel in which Morena had a majority in almost every case. However, this does not mean that Morena is (or acted as) a monolithic bloc; rather, everything indicates that the candidates for the various positions reflect the diversity of interests within Morena’s factions and some societal groups, including organized crime.
The main argument used to justify the election was that democracy means electing judges directly by the electorate. The logic behind this is a literal interpretation of democracy, as opposed to the traditional liberal definition, which includes checks and balances. Above all, the reform rejects the notion that the role of the judiciary is to interpret and enforce the law, and, in the case of the Supreme Court, to resolve “ties” between the other two branches of government — the executive and the legislative.
Three considerations about what lies ahead:
How Mexico disappears the missing
by Emiliano Polo.
Mother’s Day in Mexico has increasingly become a day of protest for women whose children have disappeared in the context of a deepening national crisis. This year, demonstrations in cities such as Mexico City and Guadalajara on May 10 demanded both recognition for the search efforts undertaken by families and guarantees for their safety, particularly in light of the growing number of searchers who have been murdered. These protests stressed a disturbing pattern: those who step in to do the work the state has failed to carry out are now being targeted themselves. In reclaiming public space and visibility, these women not only confront institutional abandonment but also redefine courage as a form of political resistance towards a government that promotes impunity to hide its incapacity.
Behind the more visible violence of organized crime and drug trafficking in Mexico lies a more profound, less acknowledged crisis. While homicides and cartel-related violence dominate headlines, the fate of over 125,287 missing persons—according to the Ministry of the Interior’s registry—remains unknown. The impunity around the tragedy results from both deliberate government action and inaction.
The Mexican government has thoroughly undermined its own capacity to respond to this crisis by slashing budgets, weakening judicial and investigative institutions, and manipulating official databases to obscure the exact scale of the missing persons crisis. The Office of the Attorney General, for example, has ignored its legal responsibilities, particularly in identifying the thousands of bodies buried in clandestine graves and in establishing a comprehensive National Program of Exhumations.
Claudia Sheinbaum’s terrible, no good, very bad week
by David Agren.
Claudia Sheinbaum has suffered perhaps the worst week of her administration – marked by the murders of two senior functionaries in the Mexico City government.
How bad was her week?
Over the weekend, the Cuauhtemoc, a Mexican Navy ship, crashed into the Brooklyn Bridge while on a global goodwill tour. The crash, which New York City officials say was caused by a mechanical failure, resulted in the deaths of Naval cadets, América Yamilet Sánchez, 20, and Adal Jair Maldonado, 23.
On Tuesday, Ximena Guzmán, personal secretary to mayor Clara Brugada, and José Muñoz, a government advisor, were killed in cold blood as they commuted on a busy thoroughfare. The suspect remains at large and no motive has been offered for the assassinations.
The day before in Guanajuato state, seven young people were killed when gunmen arriving in SUVs shot up a parish festival in the town of San Bartolo de los Berrios.
Crony capitalism
by Macario Schettino.
In the 20th century, the Mexican economy - like the rest of Latin America - chose a policy known as Import Substitution Industrialization. The goal was to produce in Mexico what would be consumed domestically, and to achieve that, tariffs were imposed on imported goods. In theory, infant industries would be able to survive, become competitive, and tariffs could then be eliminated. The opposite happened: tariffs had to be increased because domestic industry never became competitive. Eventually, the economy was completely closed off and suffered its worst peacetime crisis in 1982.
In 1986, an attempt was made to reverse course. Mexico joined the GATT, implemented an anti-inflationary plan, renegotiated its external debt, and even signed a trade agreement with the United States and Canada. After a deep but brief crisis, the benefits of NAFTA became evident. In the final years of the 20th century, Mexico grew at rates it hadn’t seen in decades.
In 2001, China joined the WTO (GATT’s successor), and the dot-com recession hit the United States. This derailed the Mexican economy, which was unable to resume strong growth, instead remaining at an average annual rate of around 2%. During those years, many studies - by Mexican and foreign academics, agencies, and institutions - tried to identify the reasons why Mexico could not grow faster.
As new Ambassador arrives, what next for the US & Mexico?
by Gerónimo Gutiérrez.
Six months after President Claudia Sheinbaum's initial call with then President-elect Donald Trump, the state of US - Mexico relations remains something of a puzzle. On the surface, early exchanges between the two leaders suggested a cordial start: Trump publicly referred to Sheinbaum as an "intelligent lady he could do business with," while Sheinbaum described their conversations as "productive" and appreciated what she called his "respect for Mexico." Yet this initial goodwill has given way to a more confrontational tone in recent weeks, reflecting growing difficulties beneath the diplomatic pleasantries that challenge the foundation of Sheinbaum’s strategy.
On the early days of May, Sheinbaum confirmed that she had rejected her counterpart´s offer to use US troops to go after cartels in Mexican territory. Trump in turn opined that she was “so afraid of the cartels she can’t walk”. More recently, news reports in Mexico and the US have suggested that the US government intends cancel the visas and seize the US assets of Mexican politicians from the President’s party, allegedly due to links with drug trade and corruption. Raising the profile of these reports, the Governor of Baja California in the past days confirmed her visa was canceled, although she has alleged no wrongdoing and official information remains scant.
What was already a complex negotiation at the beginning of the year on trade (tariffs and USMCA review), security and immigration, has become more difficult with new irritants. As examples we can point to the case of water management of the shared river basins of the Colorado en Bravo rivers, or the decision by the United States Department of Agriculture to suspend all imports of live cattle due to phytosanitary concerns. In all areas of the relationship tensions seem to be mounting rather than receding. Perhaps the only exception is immigration, where migrant encounters along the border – a proxy used to measure illegal immigration – have drastically diminished in April to 12,035, from 179,737 the same month last year.
Baja California’s Governor loses US visa
by David Agren.
When US President Donald Trump alleged an “intolerable alliance” between drug cartels and the government of Mexico - made as he first unveiled tariffs on the country in January - Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum bitterly objected.
She branded the claims “slander,” and shone a spotlight back on the US. “If there’s a place that such an alliance exists it’s with US gunmakers, which sell high-power weapons to these criminal groups,” she said.
Sheinbaum later showed White House evidence for its narco-alliance claim, which featured a news story on former public security secretary Genaro García Luna – a common foil for Sheinbaum and her ruling Morena Party – being convicted in a US court of taking bribes from the Sinaloa Cartel. She used the White House including his case as proof that drug-cartel collusion was a thing of the past.
Development plans for Estadio Azteca bypass Indigenous consultation
by Madeleine Wattenbarger.
Next year’s World Cup will be the third to take place at the Estadio Azteca, which is located in the southern Mexico City neighborhood of Santa Úrsula Coapa. In preparation for the 2026 sporting event, Mexico City mayor Clara Brugada has announced a series of public works around Santa Úrsula, a historic indigenous town, one of dozens now absorbed by the metropolis. But the authorities have yet to carry out the indigenous consultation process required by the Mexican constitution and international law, and neighbors are concerned about the event’s toll on the area’s natural resources.
“In ‘70 and ‘86, there were a lot of people and a lot of money spent, but who took that money home? Here, they didn’t so much as paint a fence,” says Rubén Ramirez Almazan, the traditional authority figure of Santa Ursula’s indigenous governance structure. ”We aren’t against the project, but they have to do feasibility studies, and the people have to decide whether they do the projects or not.”
The plan includes an elevated bike lane from the Zocalo to the Estadio Azteca, a nine-mile stretch planned above the existing metro line, and a remodeling of the existing lightrail train.
“It’s concerning because we don’t have any information about the impact, if there’s any kind of program for security, waste management or the water supply,” adds Natalia Lara Trejo, a resident of Santa Úrsula. She’s one of a group of neighbors demanding more transparency around the World Cup preparations.