Mexico’s new security laws expand military power and erode civilian oversight
The final stage of the National Guard’s militarization is now underway.
In September 2024, former President López Obrador amended the Constitution to formally place the National Guard—already operating in practice as a military force—under the control of the Ministry of Defense. Last week, Congress convened an extraordinary session to approve legal reforms introduced by President Claudia Sheinbaum. These reforms aim to align at least nine existing laws with the 2024 constitutional amendment and complete the transformation of the National Guard into the fourth branch of the armed forces. These secondary laws mark the culmination of the process initiated by López Obrador and underscore that Morena’s priorities remain unchanged.
Throughout its electoral victories, Morena has made clear its conviction that the military should play a prevalent role in public life. The secondary legislation has further entrenched this vision, and the concern lies not merely in the specific laws being passed, but in the broader ambition to forge a new political regime defined by the primacy of military authority. In liberal democracies, the military sphere is deliberately constrained; in illiberal regimes, it is expanded.
Before the 2024 reform, the Constitution stated that in times of peace, the military could not perform any activities other than those strictly related to military discipline. The constitutional reform changed this, allowing the armed forces to carry out any function established by secondary law. This is a significant shift which opens up many new possibilities for what the armed forces are allowed to do.
For example, the amendments submitted to the legislature expand the powers of this body, authorizing it, among other things, to intercept private communications and carry out undercover operations. This move comes alongside…
Judicial reform is Sheinbaum’s Frankenstein
by Emiliano Polo.
Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum will not govern the political order she has helped construct. Under the guise of a so-called “judicial reform,” she has championed the creation of a new political system, one that now lies beyond her control. In their relentless pursuit of domination, she and her party failed to establish a coherent regime, instead unleashing a disordered and volatile landscape they neither fully understand nor command. She likely believed she was inheriting the rewards of a master plan orchestrated by the previous López Obrador administration to concentrate power. In reality, she accepted a Faustian bargain, one that now threatens to consume its intended beneficiaries.
Illiberal regimens indeed have to subdue and weaken the judiciary not only because they are barricades against arbitrariness, but because judicial systems are complex arrangements, hard to redesign and reestablish; any attempt by the opposition to reestablish the rule of law will be an arduous and lengthy process: national legal systems go beyond norms, bills, lawyers, and judges; they shape and constitute practices, mores, and attitudes that are hard to reconstruct.
The president and the ruling party, which no longer complies with her wishes, will control some judges, maybe most of the time, but not all the time; and it is precisely in this projection of inconsistency that a sign of weakness will prevail instead of power and control.
This was a reform not just designed to weaken the judiciary but to distribute it as a bounty; as in any corrupt scheme or proposition, the supporters expected their reward and part of the spoils. Likely, the president thought she would be spared from the unpredictable and anarchic environment that she sponsored; most likely, she will be a victim.
Morena’s voter disconnect laid bare in judicial vote
by David Agren.
Former president Andrés Manuel López Obrador appeared in public for the first time in eight months to cast his ballot in the recent judicial elections. The man known as AMLO voted using a cheat sheet, which listed the candidates endorsed by his Morena party.
“I wanted to participate in this historic election,” AMLO said afterward. “I’m very happy to live in a free and democratic country.”
AMLO along with his protégé and successor, President Claudia Sheinbaum – whom he lauded Sunday as “the best president in the world” – hailed the election of nearly 900 judges and magistrates as a democratic success.
The country’s hapless opposition branded the exercise a farce and boycotted the process. Many Mexicans, meanwhile, showed a crushing indifference and stayed home; just 13% of registered voters cast ballots, while 10% of those ballots were annulled.
The elections delivered the outcome that AMLO presumably wanted when he purged the courts with his so-called judicial reform and put all judges and magistrates, including supreme court justices, to popular vote.
The supreme court candidates on most of the cheat sheets distributed by Morena operatives won their races. Three of the justices: Yasmín Esquivel, Lenia Batres, Loretta Ortiz, were already on the bench – with the first two nominated by AMLO – while of the others had ties to the former president.
Mexico’s judiciary now serves many masters
by Jacques Coste.
Many analysts have argued that Mexico’s recent judicial elections removed the last check on presidential power because several candidates with clear connections or affinities with Morena won, and hence the Supreme Court justices will be aligned with the ruling party. But this is only part of the story. The scenario is even worse. Mexico’s judiciary will respond partially to the interests of the executive branch, but it will also respond to the objectives of different regional elites, such as local political leaders, businesspersons, law firms, and organized-crime groups.
The reason why so many analysts believe that Mexico’s judiciary will exclusively respond to the president’s wishes is that they are taking the PRI regime as a model. However, there are two problems with this assumption.
First, during the PRI regime, the Supreme Court - and the judicial system as a whole - wasn’t as subsumed into the power orbit of the executive branch as is generally thought. As historian Pablo Mijangos argues, while it is true that the post-revolutionary Supreme Court lent constitutional legitimacy to the actions of the sitting president, it is also true that the justices enjoyed broad autonomy when deciding the majority of cases, which did not clearly concern the executive branch.
In other words, during the PRI regime, the judiciary supported the hegemonic party in controversies directly linked to the interests of the sitting president. But the way judges resolved cases between common citizens depended on a combination of factors, such as the ideology and capabilities of the judges, money and power differentials between the parties involved, and relationships (or lack thereof) between the citizens and PRI members or government officials who could help them pressure the judges. This will be the case once again in Mexico - but with an additional layer of complexity. And this is where the second problem with the assumption that the president will control the entire judiciary comes in.
On Mexico’s imminent risk
by Macario Schettino.
Last Sunday, elections were held in Mexico—very unusual elections that are virtually unheard of in any other country in the world. Judges, magistrates, and justices were elected in order to completely replace the Supreme Court, to create a new Judicial Discipline Tribunal, and to fill the federal and local electoral courts, which had been incomplete. Not only that—more than eight hundred circuit magistrates and judges were elected, for a total of 881 positions.
With this election, and the law that made it possible, the Judicial Branch in Mexico ceases to be autonomous and becomes subordinated to the Executive Branch, which also controls the Legislative Branch thanks to the qualified majorities it obtained illegally just days after last year’s presidential election. Put more simply, Mexico ceases to be a republic and becomes an authoritarian system. The new judges will take office in September.
This new distribution of power—or rather, concentration of power—is a major change from just a few years ago, when the USMCA was signed, and it actually contradicts that agreement. It adds to changes in energy policy, which are also incompatible, and I don't think it will make negotiations for a new deal with the United States and Canada any easier. Even more concerning, the risk for existing investments in Mexico has increased, as the mechanisms previously available for dispute resolution have disappeared.
Many Mexicans won’t vote in Sunday’s judicial elections; will AMLO?
by David Agren.
Mexico holds judicial elections on Sunday, which will select nearly 900 judges – including supreme court justices – via popular vote. But the much anticipated elections are unfolding amid confusion, controversial candidates, and crushing disinterest – with voters paying scant attention and the ruling MORENA party marshalling voters in what was supposed to be a non-partisan vote. Then there’s the opposition boycott.
President Claudia Sheinbaum targeted the opposition throughout the week leading up to the June 1 vote. She jawboned them from the bully pulpit of her morning press conference. And she employed the familiar schoolyard taunt effectively used by her predecessor and populists the world over: I know you are but what am I?
“Who is more anti-democratic: the ones calling for everyone to elect the judiciary or the ones calling for not voting? Who is more democratic?” Sheinbaum said in the Wednesday mañanera. “The argument is very convoluted, isn’t it? If the president had wanted to pick the Supreme Court’s justices, we wouldn’t have ended up as we were before. Why all the fuss?”
Three points on Mexico’s judicial vote
by Luis Rubio.
Judicial reform reaches its critical moment this coming Sunday. After the constitutional reform was approved last September, this Sunday citizens will vote for judges, magistrates, and justices of the Supreme Court of Justice. There is no precedent in the world (with the small exception of Bolivia) where a country has undertaken an exercise of this nature. The requirements for someone to aspire to one of these positions were minimal and unrelated to the function they are to perform. In fact, the most important requirement was having been approved by a panel in which Morena had a majority in almost every case. However, this does not mean that Morena is (or acted as) a monolithic bloc; rather, everything indicates that the candidates for the various positions reflect the diversity of interests within Morena’s factions and some societal groups, including organized crime.
The main argument used to justify the election was that democracy means electing judges directly by the electorate. The logic behind this is a literal interpretation of democracy, as opposed to the traditional liberal definition, which includes checks and balances. Above all, the reform rejects the notion that the role of the judiciary is to interpret and enforce the law, and, in the case of the Supreme Court, to resolve “ties” between the other two branches of government — the executive and the legislative.
Three considerations about what lies ahead:
Judicial candidates turn AMLO symbols into campaign props
by David Agren.
César Gutiérrez Priego took a recent flight to Cancún in his campaign for a seat on Mexico’s Supreme Court. He made the trip a tour of the mega-projects built by Andrés Manuel López Obrador – the former president whose purge of the judiciary ushered in the judicial elections in the first place.
Gutíerrez, a criminal defence lawyer with a large social media following, made a point of flying from the Felipe Ángeles International Airport (AIFA) – the thinly-used facility in the boonies north of Mexico City championed AMLO and promoted heavily by 4T influencers.
He posted a customary photo from the landmark Piedra del Sol (Aztec calendar) replica in the cavernous AIFA terminal. He also made sure people knew he was taking Mexicana de Aviación, the military-run airline revived by AMLO, which cancelled more than half its routes earlier this year. Upon arriving in Cancún, he took a ride on the Tren Maya, the railway circling the Yucatán Peninsula.
