Mexico is paying a high price for its opposition parties’ malaise
by Gerónimo Gutíerrez.
Editor’s note: Amb. Gutíerrez served as Mexico’s Ambassador to the United States and also as Mexico’s Undersecretary for Governance.
Mexico’s political opposition today finds itself in a dire position. Since its founding in 2014, the ruling Morena Party has made extraordinary gains. It now holds the presidency, 23 of 32 governorships, comfortable majorities in the federal congress and 27 state legislatures, and, together with its allied parties (the Workers' Party, or PT, and the Green Party, or PVEM), has the power to enact laws and even amend the Constitution at will. President Sheinbaum enjoys exceptionally high approval ratings (around 70%), much like her predecessor, former President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, did.
In recent years, Morena-led governments have taken actions that appear to significantly weaken institutional checks and balances, the separation of powers, and democratic norms. To be sure, Morena and the President reject this characterization — but critics, both in Mexico and abroad, make a persuasive case. For example, the Global Democracy Index published by The Economist now classifies Mexico as a hybrid regime, no longer even a flawed democracy.
In the 2024 election, the traditional parties (PAN, PRI, and PRD) received only 27% of the presidential vote, compared to the 60% won by Claudia Sheinbaum. Currently, the PAN governs just four states, the PRI only two, and both hold modest parliamentary groups in Congress. The PRD no longer exists. Movimiento Ciudadano (MC) appears to be the emerging party. It secured a significant 10% of the presidential vote in the last election and currently governs two states. However, it is hampered by internal inconsistencies and scandals, which raise serious doubts about its long-term potential.
Under these circumstances, it is only natural to ask whether the political opposition has pursued the right strategy to counter Morena’s rise — and if not, what that strategy could look like in the future. There are no easy answers, but perhaps a few sensible working hypotheses.
In a country where 43% of the 128 million population lives in poverty (according to 2022 official figures), machine politics work. The Morena governments have built a vast platform of social programs, including direct cash transfers that reach an estimated 25 million households. Opposition parties have wavered between timidly supporting these programs and criticizing their effectiveness, political bias, and fiscal sustainability. Unless they can clearly articulate where they stand…
Crony capitalism
by Macario Schettino.
In the 20th century, the Mexican economy - like the rest of Latin America - chose a policy known as Import Substitution Industrialization. The goal was to produce in Mexico what would be consumed domestically, and to achieve that, tariffs were imposed on imported goods. In theory, infant industries would be able to survive, become competitive, and tariffs could then be eliminated. The opposite happened: tariffs had to be increased because domestic industry never became competitive. Eventually, the economy was completely closed off and suffered its worst peacetime crisis in 1982.
In 1986, an attempt was made to reverse course. Mexico joined the GATT, implemented an anti-inflationary plan, renegotiated its external debt, and even signed a trade agreement with the United States and Canada. After a deep but brief crisis, the benefits of NAFTA became evident. In the final years of the 20th century, Mexico grew at rates it hadn’t seen in decades.
In 2001, China joined the WTO (GATT’s successor), and the dot-com recession hit the United States. This derailed the Mexican economy, which was unable to resume strong growth, instead remaining at an average annual rate of around 2%. During those years, many studies - by Mexican and foreign academics, agencies, and institutions - tried to identify the reasons why Mexico could not grow faster.
Mexico’s federalism is under pressure - again
by Gerónimo Gutiérrez.
Andres Manuel López Obrador and to large extent his successor, President Claudia Sheinbaum, are criticized for concentrating political power – even to the detriment of democratic principles and norms. This criticism essentially stems from a tendency to overlook – if not undermine – the separation of powers, from dismantling of autonomous regulatory agencies or placing them under direct control of the Executive, and from an explicit decision not to interact or negotiate with opposition parties unless absolutely necessary.
To be fair, these power-concentrating actions have been possible thanks to the fact that, since 2018, Mexico’s ruling party (Morena) and its satellites have enjoyed strong voter support which granted Mr. López Obrador and President Sheinbaum comfortable legislative majorities including the supermajority needed to reform the constitution. In sum, where the current regime appreciates a historic democratic transformation of Mexico supported by the “will of the people”, its critics see the dismantling of democracy from within the regime.
Be that as it may, one development that has received less attention is the centralization of power and the public purse at the federal level of government, something that is not new to Mexico but that had gradually receded over several decades.